Why so many German WW II armor subjects?
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Matt Wiser - 09 May 2008 23:09 GMT Just why do kit manufacturers of armor models put out so many German WW II subjects? There's a lot more armor than some sub-variant of a Mark IV or Panther, and more soft- skinned vehicles than a Kubelwagen, so what's the deal? There's modern U.S., Israeli, Soviet/Russian, British, etc out there, and in a lot of cases you see that stuff used on the news, or see it on the History Channel or the Military Channel. What would it take to get more modern armor subjects available?
AMPSOne@aol.com - 09 May 2008 23:39 GMT The rule of thumb is, like criminal cases, follow the money. Most of the kits come out of the Far East and the most popular subjects with at least Japanese modelers are WWII German ones.
Too often modelers cry for a specific subject and even if a good kit is released if non-German it may be a poor seller (we'll ignore the fact that kit could sell for 40 years and still be a good kit at the end of it) ergo the manufacturer gets "gunshy" of another in the same line. That's one reason British armor kits are far and few between, and it's only recently a large number of kits of Soviet and Russian subjects have come on the market.
World popularity and longetivity have absolutely zero to do with model sales and popularity, sorry to say.
Cookie Sewell
tomcervo - 10 May 2008 05:30 GMT On May 9, 6:39�pm, AMPS...@aol.com wrote:
> Too often modelers cry for a specific subject and even if a good kit > is released if non-German it may be a poor seller (we'll ignore the > fact that kit could sell for 40 years and still be a good kit at the > end of it) ergo the manufacturer gets "gunshy" of another in the same > line. That's one reason British armor kits are far and few between, As it is now, you don't see a new British armor model unless it was sold to the Poles pre-war. I'm tired of seeing Nazi '46 stuff that never hit mockup stage in kit form while British early war armor-- which actually saw action--only comes in resin or 1/76.
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 05:56 GMT >On May 9, 6:39=EF=BF=BDpm, AMPS...@aol.com wrote: >> Too often modelers cry for a specific subject and even if a good kit [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] >never hit mockup stage in kit form while British early war armor-- >which actually saw action--only comes in resin or 1/76. amen, bro.
Matt Wiser - 10 May 2008 02:36 GMT AMPSOne@aol.com wrote:
So what's the appeal of German armor over there? Germany being the other Axis partner who lost? Or is it something else? There should be ample contempoary armor for folks to be interested in.
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 03:09 GMT >AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > folks to be >interested in. the nazis had some new tech and they lost. recipie for attraction. that and people love evil, as long as it's safe and on the shelf.
Matt Wiser - 10 May 2008 05:59 GMT AMPSOne@aol.com wrote:
>Cookie Sewell The model companies appealing to one brand of customer (the WW II German buff) at the expense of everyone else? Strange. Wouldn't a good company want to appeal to a broad range of customers in varying locales with a wide assortment of subject material?
Mad-Modeller - 10 May 2008 08:26 GMT > AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: > > [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > expense of everyone else? Strange. Wouldn't a good company want to appeal to a broad > range of customers in varying locales with a wide assortment of subject material? It's similar to 1950s automobiles. There were many besides '57 Chevys but which one always gets made into a kit? Frankly they're making the car into a clichè.
Bill Banaszak, MFE Sr.
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 16:55 GMT >> AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: >> > [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > >Bill Banaszak, MFE Sr. and the 55-56, and not as much the 60-61's
WmB - 10 May 2008 19:08 GMT >> AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: >> > [quoted text clipped - 12 lines] > > Bill Banaszak, MFE Sr. Car modeling is chained to the 60s mindset which dictates that the only car worth kitting has to be performance oriented or styled. I'm still dreaming of the day when car models shake off the chains that bind them and step into the 21st Century. A first timid step may be to recognize that in addition to the '57 Bel Air and Nomad and the '40 Ford Coupe and Convertibles, that Chevy and Ford made 2 dr posts, 4 dr posts, 2 dr and 4 dr sedans and wagons as well.
And perish the thought - not all of them had 283s and Flathead V-8s!
WmB
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 20:49 GMT >>> AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: >>> > [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] > >Wm nope, there were 265;s and 327's! and that great ford strait 6 banger.
Mad-Modeller - 11 May 2008 08:24 GMT > >> AMPSOne@aol.com wrote: > >> > [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] > > WmB Be a Mopar modeller and try not to build a half dozen 440s or Hemis. A little scrounging around can get you something a bit more typical under the hood. I do have a couple cars with Slant-6s and there is a 273 out there in the Little Red Wagon kit.
Bill Banaszak, MFE Sr.
Still hoping for some Twin-H Hudson power...
PaPaPeng - 10 May 2008 14:28 GMT >The model companies appealing to one brand of customer (the WW II German buff) at the >expense of everyone else? Strange. Wouldn't a good company want to appeal to a broad >range of customers in varying locales with a wide assortment of subject material? German WWII Armor equipment look logical and functional. Almost streamlined. Allied equipment look as if the final product is a compromise of many unrelated parts. In plastic kit assembly I can assemble most German equipment without the instruction sheet, the parts look they belong. It is easy to guess where they go and what they do in the real machine. Can't say the same with non German equipment. The logical design of German equipment allows the real thing to be easily upgraded or adapted for other war duties. The Pz III and IV chassis for example produced very good looking, meanacing and effective assault gun versions. Somehow it would have been impossible to do something similar with allied equipment.
tomcervo - 10 May 2008 14:43 GMT > The logical design of German equipment allows the real > thing to be easily upgraded or adapted for other war duties. �The Pz > III and IV chassis for example produced very good looking, meanacing > and effective assault gun versions. �Somehow it would have been > impossible to do something similar with allied equipment. Which is why some fearsome-looking assault gun would be popped by the nine Shermans that were built while the Germans were making needless mods for needless specific uses: "flamethrower tank for anti-partisan urban warfare".
Gernot Hassenpflug - 10 May 2008 14:53 GMT >>The model companies appealing to one brand of customer (the WW II German buff) at the >>expense of everyone else? Strange. Wouldn't a good company want to appeal to a broad [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > and effective assault gun versions. Somehow it would have been > impossible to do something similar with allied equipment. Maybe it is the after-effects of all the Allied propaganda and hoopla
:-) When every tank is a Tiger or Panther, and they are all impervious to one's own weapons, plus skulking in hedgerows, fighting unfairly and generally being a big PITA, it is no wonder that people are curious about these monsters despite with which the other side lost the war. Just like with the German Navy and IJN subjects, lack of survivors, plans and information makes them all the more appealing. Now of course there is a lot more exposure, the effect of which is to make it possible to build even more accurate renditions, but there is still a mystique and bias partly owing the the propaganda, and partly dare I say to the language barrier.
 Signature Gernot Hassenpflug
willshak - 10 May 2008 15:41 GMT on 5/10/2008 9:53 AM Gernot Hassenpflug said the following:
> >> [quoted text clipped - 28 lines] > propaganda, and partly dare I say to the language barrier. > I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and 'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at Bikini?
 Signature Bill In Hamptonburgh, NY To email, remove the double zeroes after @
PaPaPeng - 10 May 2008 16:58 GMT >I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and >'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at Bikini? Japanese warships turn me off. Their superstructures look like the hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig.
Gernot Hassenpflug - 10 May 2008 17:10 GMT >>I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and >>'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at Bikini? > > Japanese warships turn me off. Their superstructures look like the > hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig. Are you saying Geishas turn you off? I'm happy to take the ones you have off your hands, so to speak.
 Signature Gernot Hassenpflug
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 20:48 GMT >>>I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and >>>'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at Bikini? [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >Are you saying Geishas turn you off? I'm happy to take the ones you >have off your hands, so to speak. can i have one? a tiny one to walk on my back and make me warm sake? i'll let her ruin me financially.
Gernot Hassenpflug - 11 May 2008 01:08 GMT >>>>I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and >>>>'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at Bikini? [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > can i have one? a tiny one to walk on my back and make me warm sake? > i'll let her ruin me financially. Hah, I like that attempt at a semblance of free will. Yeah right, I'll "let" her. Ha! I say. It sounds like that old "we're just advancing in another direction" thing :-)
 Signature Gernot Hassenpflug
someone@some.domain - 11 May 2008 02:07 GMT >> In article <87tzh6m965.fsf@aikishugyo.dnsdojo.org>, Gernot Hassenpflug > <gernot@coda.ocn.ne.jp> wrote: [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] >"let" her. Ha! I say. It sounds like that old "we're just advancing in another > direction" thing :-) ok, i'm busted, i love japanese girls.....
willshak - 10 May 2008 19:17 GMT on 5/10/2008 11:58 AM PaPaPeng said the following:
> >> I wonder how popular would be museum ships, like 'Prinz Eugen' and [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig. > I often wondered why they didn't capsize as soon as they were launched, they looked so top heavy with their multi-leveled superstructures. But the Eugen was a good looking cruiser.
 Signature Bill In Hamptonburgh, NY To email, remove the double zeroes after @
Bruce Burden - 11 May 2008 03:34 GMT : Japanese warships turn me off. Their superstructures look like the : hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig. It is rather a sweeping generalization to say that all of the IJN had the "Pagoda" superstructure that their earlier battleships had.
I am not a fan of the "Pagoda" superstructures, but that will not stop me from buying the Kongo when it comes out.
On the other hand, the Takao and her sisters look very sleek with the superstructure and raked aft funnel. Plus a lot of the IJN ships seemed to avoid the "clutter" that infected the USN ships as the Pacific war ground on, what with radar, comminications and, primarily, AA mounts and their directors.
Bruce
 Signature ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX. - Thuganlitha The Power and the Prophet Robert Don Hughes
someone@some.domain - 11 May 2008 05:46 GMT >: Japanese warships turn me off. Their superstructures look like the >: hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig. [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] > > Bruce love that upside down y shaped funnels some of the big ijn boats had. was that basicall a siamese of two funnels to save space? the kongo was an awesome monster.
Bruce Burden - 12 May 2008 03:46 GMT : love that upside down y shaped funnels some of the big ijn boats had. was that : basicall a siamese of two funnels to save space? I guess it was the fore funnel. My guess would be that the superstructure created enough turbulance that they did not get a good draft w/out moving the stack aft, so they "bent" it.
Bruce
 Signature ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX. - Thuganlitha The Power and the Prophet Robert Don Hughes
someone@some.domain - 12 May 2008 04:27 GMT >: love that upside down y shaped funnels some of the big ijn boats had. was > that [quoted text clipped - 5 lines] > > Bruce on the ships i've seen, it was the only funnel.
Moramarth - 11 May 2008 12:41 GMT > I am not a fan of the "Pagoda" superstructures, but that > will not stop me from buying the Kongo when it comes out. You could try doing a "backdate" and build "Kongo" as she left Vickers Barrow-in-Furness yard in 1912. A real beauty!
> On the other hand, the Takao and her sisters look very sleek > with the superstructure and raked aft funnel. Fore Funnel? The other was a stubby tube, IIRC.
Cheers
> Bruce > -- Moramarth
Gray Ghost - 11 May 2008 18:37 GMT > On the other hand, the Takao and her sisters look very sleek > with the superstructure and raked aft funnel. Plus a lot of the > IJN ships seemed to avoid the "clutter" that infected the USN > ships as the Pacific war ground on, what with radar, comminications > and, primarily, AA mounts and their directors. Not to overstate the obvious but they would have been better served had they more of the "clutter". I get the impression that Japanese developement became quite restrained after the war started. With little manufacturing capacity (as opposed to the US) there would seem little point. How many ships did they even launch after the war started? How many were significantly modernized like older US BBs. If you look at the deaths of Muashi and Yamato, replace them with equivalent US ships, Iowas, thier escorts with US AA cruisers, etc and replace the US aircraft with the contemparaneous Japanese equivalents. I would suggest that far fewer would have made it through to launch thier weapons, torpedo or bombs and those that did would have been less likely to strike home because of the intense AA. Not because the pilots would have been any less courageous or skilled (well by that part of the war thier skills would have been much less well developd).
It always strikes me as odd that the IJN didn't put more into AA defense as the war went on, considering thier experiences unless it truly was a resource problem.
Frank
Moramarth - 11 May 2008 23:38 GMT On 11 May, 18:37, grey_ghost471-newsgro...@yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) wrote:
> It always strikes me as odd that the IJN didn't put more into AA defense as > the war went on, considering thier experiences unless it truly was a resource > problem. But they did! Even Yamato and Musashi traded a brace of triple 6.1" mounts for more 5"DP, Maya replaced her damaged twin 8" "C" turret with a couple of twin 5" DP, and many destroyers sacrificed a main battery mount to provide the topweight for more light AA - all in all, not to dissimilar to what the RN was doing. The problem for the Japanese was their light AA was a rather anemic 25mm job, they didn't (IIRC) ever upgrade to anything like the 40mm Bofors.
Regards,
> Frank Moramarth
someone@some.domain - 12 May 2008 01:46 GMT >On 11 May, 18:37, grey_ghost471-newsgro...@yahoo.com (Gray Ghost) >wrote: [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > >Moramarth and they sure didn't have proximity fuses.
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 07:27 GMT > and they sure didn't have proximity fuses. > Yeah, but you have to admire the concept of making 18 inch diameter "San-Shiki" giant shotgun shells, like the Yamato had.
Pat
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 07:16 GMT > But they did! Even Yamato and Musashi traded a brace of triple 6.1" > mounts for more 5"DP, Maya replaced her damaged twin 8" "C" turret [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > (IIRC) ever upgrade to anything like the 40mm Bofors. > Ise had those strange antiaircraft rocket launchers added around the stern after she was converted into a battleship-aircraft carrier also, although I've never read how effective they were.
Pat
someone@some.domain - 12 May 2008 01:46 GMT >> On the other hand, the Takao and her sisters look very sleek >> with the superstructure and raked aft funnel. Plus a lot of the [quoted text clipped - 21 lines] > >Frank think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. merchant ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. bushido has the same definition as macho, they both mean stupid.
PaPaPeng - 12 May 2008 03:00 GMT >think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. merchant >ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. >bushido has the same definition as macho, they both mean stupid. Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when the commander insists on going down with the ship?
someone@some.domain - 12 May 2008 04:26 GMT >>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. merchant >>ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. >>bushido has the same definition as macho, they both mean stupid. > >Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when >the commander insists on going down with the ship? that's seemingly universal. germans did it and even some americans. don't forget captain smith.....he could have left in one of the cutters, in fact, he was supposed to lead the rescue from one. and ismay got sh.t for his entire life afterwords. why didn't you go down with the ship, mr ismay? even when he was an old man.
Gray Ghost - 12 May 2008 04:50 GMT > In article <g59f24tuljonfiic6csqlik0ai6ip9gu69@4ax.com>, > PaPaPeng@yahoo.com wrote: [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > and ismay got sh.t for his entire life afterwords. why didn't you go down > with the ship, mr ismay? even when he was an old man. I can understand a captain wanting to be the last man off. And I can imagine a man being so broken of spirit at losing his ship that he wants to die, but expecting it? Hell if I was the one making up the rules I'd want them to survive, I figure that kind of a loss would be a lesson in itself and besides having made the investment in your training and experience would prefer to have use of it as long as possible. Getting killed is one thing but throwing yourself away?
I wonder if with the Germans in particular if it was the Nazi culture. You had to be the perfect Aryan all the time, maybe losing a ship made you less than perfect. Hitler was great at wasting whole armies with unrealistic orders to stand and fight to the last man, would a captain not feel the same pressure? You lost your ship so you're a disgrace, die to save face. The captain of the Graf Spee killed himself 3 days after the sinking. What else could it be.
Frank
Bruce Burden - 13 May 2008 03:55 GMT : I can understand a captain wanting to be the last man off. And I can imagine : a man being so broken of spirit at losing his ship that he wants to die, but : expecting it? I expect the USS Indianapolis wished he had gone down with his ship, especially after his own service ambushed him by brionging in the Japanese skipper who torpedod him. Nice when the higher-ups cover their a.ses like that...
: Hell if I was the one making up the rules I'd want them to : survive, I figure that kind of a loss would be a lesson in itself and besides : having made the investment in your training and experience would prefer to : have use of it as long as possible. Unfortunately, even the best services have the occasional time where it is more convenient to sacrafice an underling that take the blame for a FUBAR'd situation.
Otherwise, I agree that it is best to retrieve all your assets, and learn what went so wrong un the situation. If it was a case of "simple" incompetence, then you can hang them out to dry. Of course, there is always the paragraph above to make a mockery of "what is the right thing to do".
: Getting killed is one thing but throwing : yourself away? : : I wonder if with the Germans in particular if it was the Nazi culture. You : had to be the perfect Aryan all the time, Unless you were the party elite. After all, all of Hitlers inner circle were the perfect model of Aryan manhood...
: maybe losing a ship made you less : than perfect. Hitler was great at wasting whole armies with unrealistic : orders to stand and fight to the last man, would a captain not feel the same : pressure? There is a "slight" difference between Hitler and his idiotic orders and expectations, much less the circle of ass-kissers that he surrounded himself, and being a lowly captain that either retreats or surrenders when faced with a hopeless situation. Any number of people could order your death sentence for retreating as a captai, but Hitler was not so good about repramanding himself...
: You lost your ship so you're a disgrace, die to save face. The : captain of the Graf Spee killed himself 3 days after the sinking. What else : could it be. I think the Graf Spee's capitan knew he was as good as dead, one way or another, and took the path that ensured the survival of his crew, short of surrendering to the RN. (such action would have reflected on them, right or wrong).
I also suspect the Graf Spee's captain had a lot of reservations about the direction Germany was going under Hitler, so again, took the "easy" way out.
Bruce
 Signature ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX. - Thuganlitha The Power and the Prophet Robert Don Hughes
someone@some.domain - 13 May 2008 05:04 GMT >: I can understand a captain wanting to be the last man off. And I can imagine >: a man being so broken of spirit at losing his ship that he wants to die, but [quoted text clipped - 56 lines] > > Bruce he wasn't a nazi, according to a couple of sources i've read.
Gernot Hassenpflug - 13 May 2008 05:25 GMT /good post snipped/
> I think the Graf Spee's capitan knew he was as good as dead, > one way or another, and took the path that ensured the survival of [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > about the direction Germany was going under Hitler, so again, took > the "easy" way out. I disagree on that "he was as good as dead". First, one gets the impression he was liked by his crew---this means that he has the best support group a man in his position could desire; second, internment fort he crew would have been the key to their survival in the war (imagine had they all be drafted to the U-boat arm on their speculated return to Germany); third, legally he had done everything right, and honorably to boot---none of the Allied ship commanders was going to point an accusing finger at him, as they must have been glad not to have had to engage the Graf Spee further as well as respected the fighting capability of her crew.
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Gray Ghost - 14 May 2008 03:13 GMT > /good post snipped/ > [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > have had to engage the Graf Spee further as well as respected the > fighting capability of her crew. The Brits had him convinced that heavy cruiers and even a BB was on station when they were only on thier way. There was no way for him to know and against that array he would no better than Bismark did later.
Bismark! Bone headed naval mission of the war. No escort at all after Prinz Eugen detached, had to know there were at least 3 fleet carriers out there plus the Home Fleet and Med fleet. Enough BBs to well sink a battleship. And the Germans had already had enough experience dealing out pain from the air they should have known better. If they'd even sent the Arados up to harass the Swordfish, they had 3, they were much faster by 2X and had 20MM cannons for pete sake. No torpedo in the stern busting the rudder and she would have made Brest easy.
Interestingly enough, according to Wiki: In November 1938 Lütjens was one of only three flag officers who protested in writing against the anti-Jewish "Kristallnacht" programs.
and
... he was one of the few officers who refused to give the Nazi salute when Hitler visited the Bismarck before its first and final mission, substituting for it the traditional naval salute.[12] Lütjens also wore by choice the dirk of the Kaiserliche Marine, rather than the more modern Kriegsmarine dirk which bore a swastika.
Frank
Bruce Burden - 14 May 2008 06:09 GMT : I disagree on that "he was as good as dead". You mis-understand. I agree with everything that you said, and I did not mean to imply that suicide was an easy decision for Langsdorff.
My point was, had he not committed suicide, it was very likely that the Gestapo would have paid him a visit, or arranged for a suitable... "accident" when he was interred in Argentina. Or, created "accidents" for his family in Germany until he was forced to return.
By committing suicide, he shielded his crew and family from reprisals.
Bruce
 Signature ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX. - Thuganlitha The Power and the Prophet Robert Don Hughes
Gernot Hassenpflug - 14 May 2008 23:02 GMT > : I disagree on that "he was as good as dead". > : [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > By committing suicide, he shielded his crew and family from > reprisals. That's an interesting point of view, but I am afraid I don't know enough about the Nazi policies to comment further.
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Gray Ghost - 14 May 2008 02:56 GMT >: I can understand a captain wanting to be the last man off. And I can >: imagine a man being so broken of spirit at losing his ship that he wants [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > the Japanese skipper who torpedod him. Nice when the higher-ups > cover their a.ses like that... Well I think it was a kind of end of war mentality at play there which is why she was so lax. BUT I can't even for a minute imagine sending on her way WITHOUT an escort. While there was sopme fault to apply for the condition of the ship, his treatment was uncalled for.
>: Hell if I was the one making up the rules I'd want them to >: survive, I figure that kind of a loss would be a lesson in itself and [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > Unless you were the party elite. After all, all of Hitlers inner > circle were the perfect model of Aryan manhood... Maybe a few more of them should have taken a fatal course. How about Fat Herman in a Stuka over the Channel?
>: maybe losing a ship made you >: less [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > his crew, short of surrendering to the RN. (such action would have > reflected on them, right or wrong). Yeah but he was skunked, the cruiuser were still pretty beat up and none of the reinforcements had gotten ther yet. The British made it sound like the South Atlantic Squadron was already in place. He probably did the right thing for his crew under the circumstances.
> I also suspect the Graf Spee's captain had a lot of reservations > about the direction Germany was going under Hitler, so again, took > the "easy" way out. I get the impression that not a lot of the "professional" military were Nazis or even cared. They initial take was that Germany was rearming making itself stronger again, as professional military men and as Germans that cared about Germany they were willing to bargain with Hitler. They probably didn't realize where it was going until it was to late. Certainly revenge on France was on many minds and did you know that Poland petitioned for the dissolution of Germany early in the 30s?
> Bruce Frank
Bruce Burden - 14 May 2008 06:21 GMT : Well I think it was a kind of end of war mentality at play there which is why : she was so lax. BUT I can't even for a minute imagine sending on her way : WITHOUT an escort. While there was sopme fault to apply for the condition of : the ship, his treatment was uncalled for. My understanding is that the Indianapolis got caught in a "perfect storm" of circumsatances.
First - she was not zigzagging. Why? Intelligence had decided there were no Japanese submarines in the area. How do you know there is no submarine in 100,000 square miles of ocean? I don't know. Certainly not with '40's technology.
Second - The Indianapolis was leaving the Central Pacific, which was under the control of US Navy, and entering the South Pacific, which was under control of the Army - specifically, "Dougout Doug" McArthur. Needless to say, there was no love lost between the two commands. When the Indianapolis did not report in, the Southern Pacific command decided the Indy had not been transferred as expected, and the Central Pacific command was not expecting any kind of arrival receipt. Since she was in this inter-command zone, no alarm was raised when she did not appear/ no arrival confirmation was issued. It was a fluke that some scout plane followed the oil slick back to the (surviving) crew.
Now, you can argue that the Indy should have been zig-zagging, but IIRC, the Lusitania zigged (or zagged) right into a firing solution for the U-boot that got her.
To me, the Indy's captain was sacfificed on the alter of post war a.s-covering/career advancement.
Bruce
 Signature ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX. - Thuganlitha The Power and the Prophet Robert Don Hughes
Gray Ghost - 14 May 2008 03:19 GMT >: I can understand a captain wanting to be the last man off. And I can >: imagine a man being so broken of spirit at losing his ship that he wants [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > the Japanese skipper who torpedod him. Nice when the higher-ups > cover their a.ses like that... Well I think it was a kind of end of war mentality at play there which is why she was so lax. BUT I can't even for a minute imagine sending on her way WITHOUT an escort. While there was sopme fault to apply for the condition of the ship, his treatment was uncalled for.
>: Hell if I was the one making up the rules I'd want them to >: survive, I figure that kind of a loss would be a lesson in itself and [quoted text clipped - 20 lines] > Unless you were the party elite. After all, all of Hitlers inner > circle were the perfect model of Aryan manhood... Maybe a few more of them should have taken a fatal course. How about Fat Herman in a Stuka over the Channel?
>: maybe losing a ship made you >: less [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > his crew, short of surrendering to the RN. (such action would have > reflected on them, right or wrong). Yeah but he was skunked, the cruiuser were still pretty beat up and none of the reinforcements had gotten ther yet. The British made it sound like the South Atlantic Squadron was already in place. He probably did the right thing for his crew under the circumstances.
> I also suspect the Graf Spee's captain had a lot of reservations > about the direction Germany was going under Hitler, so again, took > the "easy" way out. I get the impression that not a lot of the "professional" military were Nazis or even cared. They initial take was that Germany was rearming making itself stronger again, as professional military men and as Germans that cared about Germany they were willing to bargain with Hitler. They probably didn't realize where it was going until it was to late. Certainly revenge on France was on many minds and did you know that Poland petitioned for the dissolution of Germany early in the 30s?
> Bruce Frank
Mad-Modeller - 14 May 2008 04:00 GMT Frank typed out:
> did you know that Poland petitioned for the dissolution of Germany > early in the 30s? That's a new one to me but I see a delicious turnabout there. Whilst I couldn't wholly back the post-Pilsudski Polish government, I think they foresaw a problem the rest of the world chose to ignore. One wonders how much of the history of the '40s would have changed had the world not suffered through a depression in the '30s. It gave the radicals a weapon to use against the established government.
Bill Banaszak, MFE Sr.
Gray Ghost - 12 May 2008 04:37 GMT >>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. >>merchant ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. >>bushido has the same definition as macho, they both mean stupid. > > Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when > the commander insists on going down with the ship? I finished a rather interesting battle history of the IJN in WWII recently. I also just got through Miracle at Midway. One of the things that truly disturbed me was this desire to die with thier ship from the lowest rank to the highest. It was insane! You had experienced leaders and sailors developed over a decade or more just throwing themselves away. It just doesn't make any sense at all, thier loss denied the IJN of any further use. I sometimes get the impression that when USN or RN ships went down it tended to make the survivors smarter and warier, both excellent traits in command rank.
The other thing I got was the Japanese may have good ships and men and good tactics at least at night, but the entire strategic command structure was hopelessly flawed. Thier plans were unneccesarily complex, often splitting thier forces in an attempt to create clever flanking moves that turned up nothing. They also allowed no contingency plans for setbacks or reverses.
This is so clear in MaM. They split thier capital ships up into ridiculous fleets hundreds of miles apart. Nagumo could certainly have used the additional AA protection of Yamamoto's group. And there was no possibility of risking these ships, we had few enough planes to handle the job at hand. And sending the invasion force separately is also questionable, weren't they spotted first and gave the game away? They should have just pulled them altogether ala the 3rd/5th Fleets for mutual protection. They had several carriers that were not committed to the schwerpunkt of the whole thing, Alaska indeed what were they thinking? I'm sure it looked swell on paper.
And they had done no what if planning like what if we are spotted before we are supposed to, what if the CVs sortie early and are already there, what if somehow we lose a few CVs. The shock on Nagumo's staff and the other senior leadership was paralyzing, they got zapped because they couldn't make up thier mind if Midway or the carriers were more important. And after they found out they seemed utterly absent of a single coherent thought between the bunch of them.
I am convnced that they could have taken Midway in spite of the loss of the 4 carriers. We were really just holding on by then having lost many aircraft. And it is unlikely we would have caught them flatfooted a second time in one battle. They had sent cruisers in to bombard Midway but then dithered and recalled them. If they'd had even 2 of the smaller carriers with Zeros for CAP to protect the fleet, they likely could have flattened Midway's defeneses with their BBs and CAs and pulled it off anyway. There seemed some uncertainy as to which objective was supreme, sink the US CVs or take the island. They could have really made a stink if they had, resupply might not have been that easy but what could we have done about it? Yorktown was gone, Hornet's air group was a shambles, Enterprise had no torpedo bombers left, just Dauntlesses and Wildcats.
I have come to the conclusion that Yamamoto whatever his good qualities were was not a great strategic or tactical thinker. Nagumo was far to cautious and tended to dither at the wrong moment. You might even say they did us a favor knocking out the BBs and forcing us to rely on the CVs. And missing the oil storage and repair facilities? We were able to repair and refuel just six months later enough ships to break thier backs at Midway. Yeah PH was brilliant, but it was a surprise and most surprises succeed because the victims aren't expecting it especially when you aren't at war with anyone.
Ah well, just one man's opinion.
Frank
PaPaPeng - 12 May 2008 14:19 GMT >>>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. >>>merchant ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. [quoted text clipped - 61 lines] > >Frank Those questions crossed my mind too when I read those detailed historical accounts years ago. I think you have identified the factors behind their lack of tactical initiative without quite arriving at the explanation. My analysis is that the Japanese were well aware of their weakness in industrial capacity. Every major warship of theirs was a precious asset they could't afford to lose. Thus although there was no clear order to avoid damage or loss this risk was always at the back of their minds and inhibited bold action. With modest damage or a setback in their plans their reaction was to withdraw and refit to full fighting trim. The trouble is in a clash between large naval formations there are no refights. Encounters between ships are rare and must be fought to conclusion. Once committed to a mission one must press on and accept the loss of one's ships. The only solution is to take out the enemy first and take out as many as possible before oneself is disabled or sunk. Japanese inability to realise this also lost them the opportunity to massacare the American landing in the Philippines.
Gray Ghost - 13 May 2008 01:37 GMT >>>>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. >>>>merchant ships just weren't fitting to the bushido spirit. [quoted text clipped - 83 lines] > inability to realise this also lost them the opportunity to massacare > the American landing in the Philippines. Excellent observation. But that begs the question - Why go to war in the first place if you're not going to fight to win? He who dares big, wins big. I wonder if the big win against the Russians affected thier thinking, distorting reality. The Russian navy was a shell of it's former self by the time it got to Japanese waters. But Togo seemed to have loomed large in the minds of the Japanese officers, Yamamoto having been there. Where was the daring and dash of that battle?
I realize the Grand Strategy was to create a defensive perimeter, but did noone realize the inherent weakness of this? I think Yamamoto clearly grasped what Japan was getting into, but it amazes me that the oh-so-smart Nazis and Imperial Japanese couldn't get past thier lightning victory planning and could not see beyond thier immediate event horizon. Especially since they both seemed destined (in thier own minds) to rule the world. Anyone with a rudimentary understanding of the size of America, the vast distances to get to it and the manufacturing capacity would have understood that if America wasn't removed from the scene it would eventually out produce everyone in safety it's very size prohibiting air incursions to vital industries in ways simple flak could not. Even among pilots, we just kept turning out aircrew class after class sent them out for a tour and brought them home to teach the group of nuggets, maybe go back out when rested. Neither of the Axis had anything close, they just ground up thier prewar and early war classes until nothing was left.
I guess the real question becomes how could they make a war they could not win, not undertand what they were wallowing into and lose the cream of thier manhood in futile battles. Many times when reading I actually feel bad for Axis soldiers, sailors and airmen because many seemed as brave and skilled as our guys but they were badly served and led by the leaders they put thier trust in which seemed more interested in thier own delusions. Think Bismark, the Luftwaffe over England - I had to stop reading one book discussing German tactics because it was just to painful to read what the leadership "thought" was happening versus what was. Same with the sacrifices in the Japanese navy - the decoy fleet at the Phillipines, the Yamato. It's pathetic.
I have this really neat book written in 1942, probably before Midway where a Naval officer spells out in detail why the Axis could not win. And brother he was dead on. His general theme was if I remember correctly "He who rules the seas, rules the world". And then described how the US and Great Britain already owned the seas focusing on basing, refueling and repair facilities around the world which the the Axis could not take from them under any circumstancs, how Germany and Japan lacked these facilites and would be starved of raw materials. Amazing stuff considering the dark days the time must have seemed.
Frank
Gernot Hassenpflug - 13 May 2008 03:46 GMT One thing overlooked here is that from the government's point of view, military personnel are---and must be---expendable, and it must be shown that they *must* be expendable, so that the enire military acts in the interests of the state and not in their own self-interest. It is all in all a huge deception as well as waste of taxpayer money.
 Signature BOFH excuse #398:
Data for intranet got routed through the extranet and landed on the internet.
Gray Ghost - 14 May 2008 02:21 GMT > One thing overlooked here is that from the government's point of view, > military personnel are---and must be---expendable, and it must be > shown that they *must* be expendable, so that the enire military acts > in the interests of the state and not in their own self-interest. It > is all in all a huge deception as well as waste of taxpayer money. I think ther is a difference between say they are expendable as opposed to saying you are going to have to suffer casualties. Noone is the richer for losing experienced men.
Maybe I'm not clear on what you said. I think of the 3rd Battle for Guadalcanal where we lost Adms. Scott and Callaghan and 2 cruiers sunk. OTOH it did break the back of the Japanese resupply missions. I don't think Halsey sent them in there knowing they would die, it was a calculated risk. Certainly it was a possibility (I saw the Halsey movie recently and the 2 scenes before and after the battle were pretty interesting) but it wasn't a suicide mission.
Frank
Gernot Hassenpflug - 14 May 2008 23:02 GMT >> One thing overlooked here is that from the government's point of view, >> military personnel are---and must be---expendable, and it must be [quoted text clipped - 7 lines] > > Maybe I'm not clear on what you said. /../ I'm basically saying, yes, to the politicians and industrial leaders the military are all expendable regardless of how useful they might be in the short term; whereas among the military, there is necessary calculated risk and the knowledge that there will be casualties.
 Signature BOFH excuse #138:
BNC (brain not connected)
Gray Ghost - 14 May 2008 02:39 GMT > One thing overlooked here is that from the government's point of view, > military personnel are---and must be---expendable, and it must be > shown that they *must* be expendable, so that the enire military acts > in the interests of the state and not in their own self-interest. It > is all in all a huge deception as well as waste of taxpayer money. I think ther is a difference between say they are expendable as opposed to saying you are going to have to suffer casualties. Noone is the richer for losing experienced men.
Maybe I'm not clear on what you said. I think of the 3rd Battle for Guadalcanal where we lost Adms. Scott and Callaghan and 2 cruiers sunk. OTOH it did break the back of the Japanese resupply missions. I don't think Halsey sent them in there knowing they would die, it was a calculated risk. Certainly it was a possibility (I saw the Halsey movie recently and the 2 scenes before and after the battle were pretty interesting) but it wasn't a suicide mission.
Unlike Yamato or the carriers at the Phillipine Sea. With almost no aircraft they were little more than targets. You have to weigh the possible results vice the losses. In those 2 cases, it should have been a foregone conclusion. The carriers might have got away if the timing had been better and still drawn off Halsey, but Yamato? At that point it should have been clear (and if it wasn't what does that say about the remaining senior staff) that once she was spotted there was no way she'd get all the way to Okinawa.
Those are clearly 2 different mindsets.
Frank
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 07:43 GMT > Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when > the commander insists on going down with the ship? > It saves him from having to explain what exactly happened to the four aircraft carriers he started out with? If I were Admiral Nagumo, I would have considered going down with the the ship being the easy way out. It took a lot of courage on his part to return to Japan after a debacle like Midway.
Pat
Gray Ghost - 21 May 2008 02:31 GMT >> Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when >> the commander insists on going down with the ship? [quoted text clipped - 8 lines] > > Pat Anyone ever consider the irony that Nagumo's caution at PH in not going back for the oil storage and repair facilities probably had a sizeable impact at Midway by allowing refit and replenishment and in Yorktown's case major repairs?
Maybe he should have been in a different line of work.
Frank
PaPaPeng - 21 May 2008 08:07 GMT >>> Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when >>> the commander insists on going down with the ship? [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > >Frank The Japanese in WWII had a systemic weaknesses in doctrine.
One of this was absolute obedience to authority. This obedience extended to plannning. Therefore once the plan was finalized and approved there was to be no variation. I'll skip the long part on grand strategy etc.
For Pearl Harbor the top priority was the capital ships, battleships and aircraft carriers (which weren't in harbor), then the smaller warships down. Once they expended their bombs and torpedos there was no more point in sticking around. Pilots had to maintain unit cohesion and could not shoot up targets of opportunity. They had already succeeded far beyond their expectations and lost less aircraft than allowed for. There was nothing about attacking other targets let alone the oil tank farm.
This wartime duration prioritization of warships (Bushido Sprit nonsense about fighting only worthy opponents) blinded them to the fact that an attack on supply ships would be far more effective in defeating the USN that was operating so far away from home. Thus IJN submarines expended their patrol endurance looking for warships instead of attacking far easier and more numerous supply ships. Their major naval units looked for fleet actions, etc.
Gray Ghost - 22 May 2008 05:45 GMT >>>> Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when >>>> the commander insists on going down with the ship? [quoted text clipped - 24 lines] > approved there was to be no variation. I'll skip the long part on > grand strategy etc. That was one of the scariest things I saw when I read Miracle at Midway. You could see the plan unraveling as they planned, had I not known the outcome I think I could have predicted it.
Even in the planning stage, one of the wargames actually the real situation as it evolved and the Japs took a beating. But rather than learn from it the referee called a foul and they got a do over and a reprimand to the OPFOR commander for not sticking with the plan.
And it is so apparent in MaM, that as the plan disintergrated that none of the senior staff could cope with any of it. It was almost surreal how men who presumably were seasoned professionals, trained to a high standard simply did not have the flexibility to shift and thrust. I still think that they could have taken Midway and once there flown land based aircraft there and off loading what remained of the aircraft from the smaller carriers would have made the island an unsinkable base. We were pretty beat up by then and the Marines in no way had time to dig in like the Japanese did later. With the cruisers and BBs in range they would have wrecked whatever the marines had ready.
> For Pearl Harbor the top priority was the capital ships, battleships > and aircraft carriers (which weren't in harbor), then the smaller [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > than allowed for. There was nothing about attacking other targets let > alone the oil tank farm. Maybe that was the problem, the planning. It was not a matter of targets of opportunity, it was a matter of recovering thier aircraft, refueling and rearming them and going back in. Hell ther only 2 US carriers in the Pacific at the time and the crews were unblooded whereas the Japanese had 6 carriers and thier experienced crews who were combat tested and likely at or very near thier zenith. Besides sinking them at sea was better for the Japanese, those sunk at PH were recoverable.
They had always operated close to home even Tsushima wasn't very far at all from Japan. Maybe they didn't really appreciate the fact that PH was or could become a major operating base thrust out into the Pacific from CONUS. But if that's the case what kind of blindness is that?
> This wartime duration prioritization of warships (Bushido Sprit > nonsense about fighting only worthy opponents) blinded them to the [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > instead of attacking far easier and more numerous supply ships. Their > major naval units looked for fleet actions, etc. Yeah that always struck me as odd. As good as the U-boats had been, as good as thier own subs and torpedos were they certainly were not used in a true strategic manner.
I'll tell you, these two books, A Battle History of the IJN in WWII and Miracle at Midway have had something of a profound impact on my thinking. The Japanese seemed to have a great deal of technical potential, albeit in limited numbers and a good deal of courage and profiecincy on the part of the lower and middle ranks, but were severly let down by senior leadership.
Sad indeed that so many good men on both sides died for a cause that was so thoroughly doomed from the start and was probably unneccesary.
Frank
WmB - 16 May 2008 17:47 GMT >>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. >>merchant [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > Can't help sneaking this in. What the hell were they thinking when > the commander insists on going down with the ship? This was a culture that lived to someday prove their service, devotion, love and loyalty to their Emperor (and thus Nippon itself) by falling on their own swords.
I'm surprised ALL of them didn't try to go down with the ship.
WmB
someone@some.domain - 17 May 2008 00:08 GMT >>>think of how they threw away a modern, really great submarine force. >>>merchant [quoted text clipped - 11 lines] > >WmB in prison camps they would wait in line to use one rope to hang themselves....
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 07:10 GMT > It always strikes me as odd that the IJN didn't put more into AA defense as > the war went on, considering thier experiences unless it truly was a resource > problem. > By the time they were sunk, the Yamato and Musashi were acrawl with AA guns, I built the 1/200th scale Yamato, and was amazed by how heavy the AA armament was.
Pat
PaPaPeng - 16 May 2008 08:44 GMT >> It always strikes me as odd that the IJN didn't put more into AA defense as >> the war went on, considering thier experiences unless it truly was a resource [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > >Pat From memory: When the main guns on the Yamato discharged the blast pressure at 15 psi was enough to strip the skin off exposed flesh. That's why the secondary guns were turreted. The decks were also clear of the normal deck stowage items. Lifeboats had to be stowed below decks. As the war progressed and US aircraft attacks became overwhelming they put AA guns everywhere that could mount one. The exposure to air attack meant that the niceties of sounding the "clear decks" alarm was no longer given enough time for the exposed gun crews to find shelter. Gun crew injuries must have been gruesome.
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 16:02 GMT > From memory: When the main guns on the Yamato discharged the blast > pressure at 15 psi was enough to strip the skin off exposed flesh. [quoted text clipped - 6 lines] > to find shelter. Gun crew injuries must have been gruesome. > When they fired the san-shiki shells it knocked out everyone on the exposed light AA gun positions on the deck, and even badly shook up most of the crew in the enclosed turrets. Enclosed turrets weren't limited to the Yamato class though; some of their carriers had them also. In that case they were only on the side that had the funnel (s) on it, so I presume that fresh air was blown through then to keep the smoke out. Yamato topped out with 24 x 5" AA guns and 152 x 25 mm ones in July of 1944. When she was sunk, she had lost two of the 25 mm ones. Though impractical, it sure was a ferocious looking monster of a ship: http://www.maritimequest.com/warship_directory/japan/battleships/yamato_page_1.htm ...like a whole fortress had put to sea. It's amazing that they were capable of keeping the construction of two ships of that size completely secret from the outside world.
Pat
WmB - 16 May 2008 17:49 GMT >>> It always strikes me as odd that the IJN didn't put more into AA defense >>> as [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > decks" alarm was no longer given enough time for the exposed gun crews > to find shelter. Gun crew injuries must have been gruesome. I watched a recent movie on the Yamato last year. As gruesome a depiction of her and her crew's death as one would imagine. From what the living survivors recount, the butcher's bill on the decks of the Bismarck was equally horrendous by any and all measures.
WmB
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 06:50 GMT > Japanese warships turn me off. Their superstructures look like the > hairpin accoutrements on a Geisha's wig. > The Takao class cruisers had a cool superstructure, like a squat pyramid. On the other hand, the ones on the Fuso and Yamashiro looked like they'd make the ship capsize.
Pat
WmB - 10 May 2008 19:38 GMT > on 5/10/2008 9:53 AM Gernot Hassenpflug said the following: >> [quoted text clipped - 29 lines] > 'Nagato', today, had they not been fodder for the atom bomb tests at > Bikini? I imagine Nagato would be a national shrine while the Eugen would never have survived much past 1946 if it had somehow escaped membership in the Bikini nuke club.
WmB
someone@some.domain - 10 May 2008 20:53 GMT >> on 5/10/2008 9:53 AM Gernot Hassenpflug said the following: >>> [quoted text clipped - 35 lines] > >WmB she would have been bugs and benz's.
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 07:03 GMT > I imagine Nagato would be a national shrine Not in Japan...there's no way they were ever going to get that ship back, lest they get funny ideas again. Maybe at Pearl Harbor though. But that would have created a lot of bad feelings in Japan.
Pat
WmB - 16 May 2008 17:43 GMT >> I imagine Nagato would be a national shrine > [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] > > Pat With the guilt ridden politics of self loathing that marks left of center modern American poltics these days, just about anything is possible. The way things are going with the history-challenged numbskulls being chruned out by US schools, at some point in my life I expect to live to suffer the sight of the US issuing Japan an apology for provoking them into attacking Pearl Harbor. I wouldn't be surprised if some dickhead like Richard Gere hasn't already spoken up on all our behalf, but I mean at an official governmental level as American policy.
God help us all for what we've become.
WmB
Pat Flannery - 17 May 2008 13:05 GMT > With the guilt ridden politics of self loathing that marks left of center > modern American poltics these days, just about anything is possible. Yeah... we torture people...and the amazing thing is that we are the _good guys_. God knows what would happen to someone who fell into the _bad guys_ hands, huh? You expect me to lay down my life to protect what we've become? For-f.cking-get-it. I wouldn't even break a sweat to defend what the "first, greatest, and best hope of humanity" has become. Everyone around the world looks like mad monkeys in the same menagerie from where I'm standing at the moment. And I sort of hoped that somewhere in my life that might have might not have been the case. But life is full of epiphanies, isn't it?
Pat
WmB - 18 May 2008 01:27 GMT >> With the guilt ridden politics of self loathing that marks left of center >> modern American poltics these days, just about anything is possible. [quoted text clipped - 14 lines] > > Pat I have no more witnesses your honor.
WmB
Gray Ghost - 18 May 2008 20:23 GMT >>> With the guilt ridden politics of self loathing that marks left of >>> center modern American poltics these days, just about anything is [quoted text clipped - 17 lines] > > WmB No kidding. It isn't just historical illiteracy. It's this banal expectation that we are supposed to be "perfect" and if we are not than we are worthless.
Personally since perfection is generally unattainable it is to me a sign of weakness, laziness and a general desire to agree with the hip and cool folks of the day, who frankly should be hung as traitors, but that's a different thread.
Frank
Pat Flannery - 20 May 2008 09:57 GMT > I have no more witnesses your honor. > You'll be happy to know that that I'm out of here before I can be suspected of treason and need to be executed for it. :-D
Pat
someone@some.domain - 20 May 2008 16:56 GMT >> I have no more witnesses your honor. >> [quoted text clipped - 3 lines] > >Pat too late. bend over and smile, here come the troothanator.
PaPaPeng - 20 May 2008 22:49 GMT >>> I have no more witnesses your honor. >>> [quoted text clipped - 4 lines] >>Pat >too late. bend over and smile, here come the troothanator. Bend over = bugger = sodomy.
As kids we used the first two terms liberally as somewhat naughty words without being outright smutty. We had no idea what they actually meant. In oriental societies (we attended an Engish language colonial school) the idea of sodomy was just too disgusting a thought even for kids to use as a taunt. Kids are instinctively adverse to homosexuality. So let's not go into gay rights and instilling understanding, etc.
"Bend over" conveyed the idea of someone who committed a boner and should bend over to receive a well deserved kick in the butt. Odd thing was we did ask among ourselves what "bugger" meant and decided it was a corruption of the word "burgher." But we never looked up the word up the dictionary and we never went to the next step of asking what that had to do with swearing. Horny was another bungled "sanitized swear word" we used feely. As we went through university a friend in medical school advised us that "horny" referred to keratinized region (same hard protein as your hair and fingernails) around the anal orifice. Thus when a doc (three or more decades ago) did a pre-employment medical or an pre-immigration screening exam and asked one to bend over that was what he was looking for.
someone@some.domain - 21 May 2008 00:19 GMT >>In article <eqqdnSc3kIs_D6_VnZ2dnUVZ_iydnZ2d@posted.northdakotatelephone>, > flanner@daktel.com wrote: [quoted text clipped - 30 lines] >did a pre-employment medical or an pre-immigration screening exam and >asked one to bend over that was what he was looking for. ah, go stuff a tube of glue in it.
WmB - 20 May 2008 21:05 GMT >> I have no more witnesses your honor. > > You'll be happy to know that that I'm out of here before I can be > suspected of treason and need to be executed for it. :-D > > Pat Come on now. We only do that to Chicom sneaker sellers.
WmB
WmB - 10 May 2008 19:15 GMT "PaPaPeng" <PaPaPeng@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>The logical design of German equipment allows the real > thing to be easily upgraded or adapted for other war duties. The Pz > III and IV chassis for example produced very good looking, meanacing > and effective assault gun versions. Somehow it would have been > impossible to do something similar with allied equipment. I don't follow you - the Allies built their share of gun and howitzer carriages on the M4 chassis and other designs. Not with the degree of reckless abandon that the Germans approached it, but then again the US and Brits didn't have the Eastern Front and equivalent or superior Russian armor to fret over.
WmB
PaPaPeng - 10 May 2008 20:02 GMT >"PaPaPeng" <PaPaPeng@yahoo.com> wrote in message >>The logical design of German equipment allows the real [quoted text clipped - 10 lines] > >WmB A matter of taste. Mine is with the crowd as reflected in kit sales and the (fictional scenario) nonsense written up in many webpages.
PaPaPeng - 11 May 2008 03:18 GMT >>"PaPaPeng" <PaPaPeng@yahoo.com> wrote in message >>>The logical design of German equipment allows the real [quoted text clipped - 13 lines] >A matter of taste. Mine is with the crowd as reflected in kit sales >and the (fictional scenario) nonsense written up in many webpages. Actually I chickened out. I am not going to comment on a baby only a mother can love and you are the mum.
Pat Flannery - 16 May 2008 06:55 GMT > I don't follow you - the Allies built their share of gun and howitzer > carriages on the M4 chassis and other designs. > Not with the degree of reckless abandon that the Germans approached it, but > then again the US and Brits didn't have the Eastern Front and equivalent or > superior Russian armor to fret over. > A Jagdpanther type conversion of a Sherman, with the glacis plate continuing right on up for around another four feet would be one odd-looking vehicle.
Pat
Bruce Burden - 11 May 2008 04:10 GMT : German WWII Armor equipment look logical and functional. Well, okay. Tiny box, small box, medium box and large box. (Pz II, III, IV and VI, respectively).
: Almost : streamlined. Hmm, clearly not talking about the boxes, now.
: Allied equipment look as if the final product is a : compromise of many unrelated parts. Hmmm, not sure what you mean. US armor shows a clear family history in the M2/M3/M5 light tanks and the M3/M4 medium tanks. It is not until the M24 and M26 that the mold is clearly broken, and even then, there is a clear "see how we evolved" pattern evident, with the M-18 serving as the link between the two sets of designs.
I think British tanks follow a very similiar pattern, in part of the artificial constrains placed on their design parameters. There things are a bit more confusing, primarily due, I believe, to who was selected to build the vehicle determining things like welded or riveted construction.
Given how completely useless the "Tank Board" was, it is no wonder British armor development seemed stuck in neutral for much of the war. However, they did realize there was a very hard fought war between armor and armament long before the US Army apparently stumbled into that awareness.
: The logical design of German equipment allows the real : thing to be easily upgraded or adapted for other war duties. "Easily" is generally not a word used with German armor. Especially when it came to repair and or upgrades. There is a reason the Su-76i only used PzIIIJ chassis - it was the last Pz III variant that used a mechanical transmission. The Sovs could fix them. I don't believe anybody could fix the pre-selector servo shifted transmission fitted to later Pz III variants. Not even the Germans. So, as a result, what the "repair" depots generally recived was a stripped tank hull, the parts otherwise being kept by the front line maintenance units for spare parts. This meant that the rear depots were basically buulding new tanks, not refurbishing them like the US Army did.
: The Pz : III and IV chassis for example produced very good looking, meanacing : and effective assault gun versions. Well, so long as you ignore the special wheels that had to be developed for those "sleek Pz IV panzerjeager" designs, which were a sure sign of an overloaded chassis. Even the assault gun version of the Pz IV needed special leading roadwheels, I believe...
Meanwhile, the M4 medium tank spawned a respectible amount of variants itself, and remained in front line service for another decade after the "uber" designs were gone and if still around,
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